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RECENT CASES
tory and surrounding circumstances of each act. Since each surplus
land statute and the reservation it affected must be individually
analyzed under the DeCoteau rationale, it appears that litigation
will continue until the boundaries of reservations affected by each
surplus land statute have been determined. Many earlier decisions
in which in-depth analyses of congressional intent were not per-
formed will undoubtedly be relitigated. This is of particular signifi-
cance to states such as North Dakota, 6 where cases involving sur-
plus land statutes prior to DeCoteau were decided with little if any
reference to the congressional history and surrounding circumstances
of the surplus land statute involved.6 At least in DeCoteau, courts
have been provided with the guidance needed to determine the ef-
fect a particular surplus land statute had on the boundaries of the
reservation involved.
JAMES M. BEKKEN
INDIANS-JURISDICTION-INDIVIDUAL CONSENT To STATE JURISDICTION
By RESERVATION INDIAN INEFFECTIVE.
In December, 1971, an automobile accident occurred on a North
Dakota state highway within the boundaries of the Fort Totten Indian
Reservation. The non-Indian plaintiff commenced an action against
the defendant, an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa Indians, in state district court. Subsequent to commence-
ment of the action, the defendant signed a document consenting to th(
68. North Dakota, on behalf of itself and nine other states, filed a brief Amici Curiae
for the respondent state court in DeCoteau. Brief for the state of North Dakota et. ar.
as Amici Curiae, DeCoteau v. District County Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425
(1975). (The nine states were California, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, Wisconsin, and Washington). In its brief, the State of North Dakota noted:
These States have all experienced the difficult nagging problems of the
questionable status of certain geographical areas which were at one time In
alan Reservations but later were deemed non-reservation areas and recently
designated as Indian reservations again. This creates a monumental problem
with law enforcement and also with the status of lands within the area par-
ticularly for the non-Indian landowners.
Id. at 1.
The Indian tribe's counterargument centers around their right of sovereignty and
a desire to have jurisdiction remain in the tribe. This right of self-government was the
paramount concern in Justice Douglas' dissent in DeCoteau v. District County Ct. for
Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 460-68 (1975).
69. Although the case must be analyzed on its own merits, there are several factors In
the recent Rosebud decision which iay be of significance In the determination of whether
New Town will be relitigated In the near future: (1) Rosebud is the first Eighth Circuit
case to extensively examine legislative history and circumstances--New Town, wherein the
result was opposite of that in Rosebud, made little use of such information. (2) One of
the acts (Act of May 50, 1910. ch. 260, 36 Stat. 448) interpreted In Rosebud was passed
by Congress only two days before the Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455 involved
in New Town. (3) The provisions of these two acts are very similar though not identical.
(4) The state of North Dakota's concern over the present status of surplus lands opened
on reservations. See note 68 supra.
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civil jurisdiction of North Dakota state courts.1 The plaintiff ob-
tained a default judgment, and service of Notice of Default was
served upon the North Dakota Highway Commissioner to initiate ac-
tion against the state's Unsatisfied Judgment Fund. 2 Counsel for the
Fund appeared on behalf of the defendant and moved to dismiss the
action on the grounds that, because the defendant was an enrolled
member of an Indian tribe residing on a reservation, she was not
subject to the jurisdiction of state courts. The case came to the North
Dakota Supreme Court upon certification of questions of laws by the
district court concerning the issue of civil jurisdiction over an Indian
defendant. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the individual
Indian's acceptance of jurisdiction was ineffective as a means of ob-
taining civil jurisdiction, since such a procedure did not comply
with provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 4 The court further
held that the state had no residuary jurisdiction 5 because this area
of civil jurisdiction had been completely preempted by the federal
law. Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D. 1975).
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-05 (1974), provides in part:
An individual Indian may accept state jurisdiction as to himself and his
property by executing a statement consenting to and declaring himself and
his property to be subject to state civil jurisdiction as herein provided. Such
jurisdiction shall become effective on the date of execution of such state-
ment ...
2. Every North Dakota vehicle owner pays each year, along with a vehicle registration
fee, one dollar for purposes of providing a fund from which plaintiffs in automobile negli-
gence actions can collect judgments against defaulting or insolvent defendants. N.D. CEN%
CODE § 39-17-04 (1972), provides that when a plaintiff initiates an action to collect from
the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund,
[T]he attorney general may enter an appearance, file a defense, appear
by counsel at the trial, or take such other action as he may deem appropriate
on behalf and in the name of the defendant, and may thereupon, on behalf
and in the name of the defendant, conduct his defense, and all acts done in
accordance therewith shall be deemed to be acts of the defendant.
3. Nelson v. Dubois, 292 N.W.2d 54, 55-56 (N.D. 1975). The relevant questions were:
(1) whether the procedure for- individual acceptance of jurisdiction in N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-19-05 (1974) (quoted at length in note 1, supra) was valid
under The Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1970) (see note 4
infra) : and
(2) whether the state courts had residuary jurisdiction over the action.
Jurisdiction over Indian affairs belongs primarily to the federal government. F.
CoeiN, HANDBOOK oF FEDEA L INDIAN LAW 89 (1942). In areas where Congress does not
exercise control, jurisdiction lies with the tribes. Id. at 122.
The concept of residuary state jurisdiction was developed by the Montana Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Ct., 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1973).
The court in that case ruled that when Congress had not preempted state jurisdiction, and
the tribe was not exercising jurisdiction in a particular area, the state could assert its
own jurisdiction in this "residual area." Id. at 343, 512 P.2d at 1299.
A concurring justice in that decision, however, argued that the residual jurisdiction
remained with the tribe, whether or not the tribe chose to exercise it. He noted that the
only reason the state could exercise jurisdiction over the Indian defendant was because
the tribe had ceded its jurisdiction to the state; the state had no residuary jurisdiction of
its own. Id. at 346, 512 P.2d at 1300.
The Montana court has not subsequently discussed the concept of residuary juris-
diction; rather it seems to have chosen to follow the interpretation expressed in the con-
curring opinion. See Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 450, 517 P.2d 893, 897 (1974).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970). This section of the Civil Rights Act defines the procedure
whereby a state may assume Jurisdiction over reservation Indians:
State Jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this subchapter . . . shall be ap-
plicable in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians within the affected
area of such Indian country accept jurisdiction by a majority vote of the
adult Indians voting at a special election held for that purpose....
5. For a definition of residual Jurisdiction, see note 3 supra.
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The extent to which states can assert civil jurisdiction over en-
rolled reservation- Indians has long been in doubt. In Worcester v.
Georgia,6 the United State Supreme Court ruled that Indian tribes
are "distinct, independent, political communities", in which state
laws have no force except by consent of the tribes themselves, or by
the authority of treaties or acts of Congress.
As a prerequisite for admission to the Union, Congress required
many states, including North Dakota, to include a disclaimer of all
jurisdiction over Indian lands in their acts of statehood.8 Some states
also included a disclaimer clause in their state constitututions9
Congress has frequently departed from this rule of exclusive fed-
eral authority over Indian lands, however. 10 At times, Congress has
acted to confer limited jurisdiction upon the states over certain Indian
lands and specific jurisdictional matters." In 1953, Congress em-
barked upon a policy which would terminate federal preemption of
jurisdiction over Indians. 2 Public Law 280,13 enacted in that year,
allowed states to assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians by af-
firmatively legislating to accept it.1  Under this Act, states could uni-
laterally assume jurisdiction over Indians without the consent of the
tribes wihin their borders. 15
In 1963 the North Dakota legislature acted to accept Public Law
6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7. Id. at 559.
8. .g., Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180,, 25 Stat. 676 (admission of Montana, Washing-
ton, North Dakota, and South Dakota) ; Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (Utah)
Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (New Mexico and Arizona).
9. N.D. CONST. art. XVI, § 203 (1960), originally read: "[S]aid Indian lands shall re7
main under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States .... "
In 1958 an amendment added: "[P]rovided, however, that the Legislative Assembly of
the state of North Dakota may, upon such terms and conditions as it shall adopt, provide
for the acceptance of such jurisdiction as may be delegated to the state by act of Con-
gress .... "
10. See discussion of congressional action in Organized Village of Eake v. Egan, 369
U.S. 60, 72-74 (1962).
11. See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229, in which North Dakota was
granted concurrent jurisdiction over criminal offenses occurring within the boundaries of
the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation.
12. H.R] . Con. Res. of Aug. 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B132, stated:
Whereas, it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the
Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same
laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable
to other citizens of the United States....
13. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 507, 67 Stat. 590.
14. Id. at § 7, provided:
The consent of the United States Is hereby given to any other State not
having jurisdiction with respect to criminal or civil causes of action, or with
respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such-
time and In such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legis-
lative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.
15. H. FEy & D. McNIcKLE, INDIANS AND OTHER AMERicANs 200 (1st ed. rev. 1970),
states:
It is especially noteworthy that President Eisenhower, in consenting to
Public Law 280, expressed concern over the failure to provide for consultation
with the Indian people and urged that Congress, in its next session, amend the
law to correct this oversight.
A consent procedure was not provided until the Civil Rights Act of 1968 was enacted. Act
of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, § 402, 68 Stat. 78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1826 (1970). Section 1326 is quoted at length in note 4 supra.
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280 jurisdiction over Indians in the state. 6 It was provided by sta-
tute that acceptance by a tribe'7 or by an individual Indian" was a
prerequisite for state assumption of civil jurisdiction, although the
granting of such consent was not required by Public Law 280. Later
that year the North Dakota Supreme Court held in In re White-
shield,'9 that
The [practical] effect of this legislation is, to completely
disclaim State jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising
on an Indian reservation unless the Indians themselves have
acted to accept jurisdiction in the manner provided by the
statute .20
Title IV of the 1968 Civil Rights Act 21 amended Public Law 280
by providing that state civil jurisdiction over actions involving Indian
defendants and arising within reservation boundaries could thereaf-
ter be assumed only after the tribe had voted in a special election to
consent to the state's assertion of jurisdiction.
22
The individual acceptance procedure23 adopted in North Dakota
became questionable in light of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, and al-
though the procedure was not directly challenged until Nelson v. Du-
bois, the North Dakota Supreme Court did express doubt as to its ef-
fectiveness in a 1974 decision.-
Other means of obtaining jurisdiction over Indian parties at vari-
ance with the Civil Rights Act procedures have also been held inef-
fective. In Kennerly v. District Court of Montana,2 5 the United States
Supreme Court held that a 1967 Blackfeet tribal law granting juris-
diction to the state was insufficient to vest civil jurisdiction in the
state in light of the provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. The Court
found that the only valid means for obtaining jurisdiction was through
affirmative legislation on the part of the state accepting civil juris-
diction, coupled with the granting of consent by the tribe, voting in a
special election for that purpose.
2 6
Noting the congressional intent manifested in the procedures in
The Civil Rights Act of 1968, and relying upon the ruling in Kennerly,
16. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-19-01 to -13 (1974).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-02 (1974).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-05 (1974) (quoted at length in note 1 swpra).
19. 124 N.W.2 ] 694 (N.D. 1963).
20. Id. at 698.
21. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, title IV, 82 Stat. 78, (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1921 to -1326 (1970)).
22. Id. at § 1326 (quoted at length in note 4.supra).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19-05 (1974). See note 1 supra.
24. Rolette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1974). Although the Issue of con-
sent was not involved in this case, the court suggested that the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 "probably makes our statute . .. ineffective for the purpose of allowing Indi-
viduals general acceptance of jurisdiction." Id. at 647.
25. 400 U.S. 428 (1971).
26. Id. at 427, 429.
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the court in Nelon v. Dubois held that "[a]n individual defendant is no
more able to confer jurisdiction upon the state than is a tribal coun-
cil or a State, acting unilaterally. ' 27 Since the Civil Rights Act re-
quires a vote of the tribe to confer jurisdiction on the state, the North
Dakota provision for individual Indian consent was held invalid.2 8
The court then considered the existence of residuary state juris-
diction, a concept discussed in the Montana case of State ex rel. Iron
Bear v. District Court.2 9 The Montana Supreme Court in Iron Bear
developed this concept by applying the "interference test" adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee. 0 In Williams,
a non-Indian who operated a store on a reservation sued an Indian in
state court to collect for goods sold on credit. The Court found that
"absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 31 Where both the
tribe and the state have a valid interest in the subject matter of the
action, the Court held, the state may assert jurisdiction only if Con-
gress has not defined the state jurisdictional power in the area in-
volved, and if action by the state would not interfere with tribal
government.3 2 The exercise of state jurisdiction in Williams was
found to unduly conflict with the interest of the tribal government in
transactions occurring on the reservation.
At issue in Iron Bear was a 1938 Assiniboine Sioux tribal en-
actment 34 ceding jurisdiction over marriage and divorce actions to
the state. On the basis of this cession by the tribal council, the Mon-
tana court held that acceptance of jurisdiction would not infringe
upon tribal self-government.3 5 Since the tribe had ceased to exercise
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce actions between its members,
the court concluded that the state could exercise its residuary juris-
diction 8 if Congress had not restricted state action in that area.3 7
The Montana court found that no Act of Congress governed di-
vorce among reservation Indians. The disclaimer in Montana's En-
27. 232 N.W.2d at 57.
28. Id.
29. 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1973).
30. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
31. Id. at 220. This principle was later extended to tort actions. Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D.
482, 161 N.W.2d 704 (1968). The Williams test has usually been applied in actions between
a non-Indian plaintiff and an Indian defendant. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n.,
411 U.S. 164, 179 (1973)..
32. Id. at 220-21.
33. Id. at 223.
34. The tribal enactment is quoted from in 162 Mont. 335, 337-38, 512 P.2d 1292, 1294
(1973). Montana had not by affirmative legislation acted to accept Public Law 280 Jurisdic-
tion. Although this tribal law was enacted prior to both Public Law 280 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, its effectiveness may be questioned under the standard established inKennerly
v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). See text accompanying note 25 and 26
supra.
35. 162 Mont. 335, 243, 512 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Mont. 1973).
36. See note 3 supra.
37. 162 Mont. 335, 346, 512 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1973).
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abling Acts8 was found to apply only to matters involving Indian
lands and not to matters involving individual Indians. The court re-
lied in part on the North Dakota case of Vermillion v. Spotted Elk 9
for this interpretation. The 'Montana court concluded that "some pre-
existing state jurisdiction remained after Public Law 280"40 as to
matters involving individual Indians, and that the state could thus
exercise its residuary jurisdiction over divorce actions between en-
rolled reservation Indians. 41
The Vermillion decision relied upon by the Montana court was
overruled by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Gourneau v. Smith4 2
a month before the decision in Iron Bear. The court in Gourneau
held that the disclaimer in North Dakota's constitution was applicable
to matters involving individual Indians as well as to those involving
their lands. 43 The Civil Rights Act of 1968 was held to apply to any
civil jurisdiction covered by the disclaimer." Since the disclaimer
was held to apply to actions involving personal rights of Indians
in Gourneau, the Civil Rights Act was found in Nelson v. Dubois to be
a "governing Act of Congress" under the Williams "interference
test. 41 5 The court was thus required to hold that North Dakota h as
no residuary jurisdiction over civil actions in which the defendants
are enrolled reservation Indians."
In dissent Justice Vogel stated that he would have held in favor
of residuary jurisdiction. 47 Tribes in North Dakota, he noted, require
38. Id. at 342, 512 P.2d at 1296. The Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, applied
to the admission of both Montana and North Dakota. Montana's disclaimer thus contains
the- same language disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian lands as that in North Dakota's
constitution. See note 9 supra.
89. 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957).
40. State ex rel. Iron Bear v District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 342, 512 P.2d 1292, 1296
(1973).
41. Id. at 345, 512 P.2d at 1298.
42. 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973). This case involved an automobile accident occurring
on a North Dakota reservation between two enrolled Indians. The defendant in this action
did not consent to state jurisdiction, however.
43. Id. at 258.
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970).
45. 232 N.W.2d 54, 58 (N.D. 1975). The court noted:
The Williams test of 'infringement' or 'interferrence' has, for all practical
purposes, been abandoned. Public Law 90-284 [The Civil Rights Act of 1968]
applies to the assumption of jurisdiction by any State over any Indian reser-
vation and as to any subject matter. It is difficult to envision a clearer state-
ment of federal preemption. Id.
46. Id. at 56.
47. Id. at 60. Justice Vogel's dissent was based in part on an Eighth Circuit decision,
Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974). That case involved an automobile acci-
dent between Indians on the Standing Rock Reservation in North Dakota. (This reservation
extends into both North Dakota and South Dakota). The Indian plaintiff was a resident
of the portion of the reservation located in North Dakota, and the Indian defendant was a
resident of the South Dakota portion of the reservation. The Eighth Circuit exercised diver-
sity jurisdiction over the matter, even though North Dakota state courts had no jurisdiction
over the action. However, the court suggested that North Dakota state courts might have
implied residuary jurisdiction over Unsatisfied Judgment Fund cases. The court, making
this suggestion, relied upon the concept of residuary jurisdiction as developed in State
ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 (1973), (see note 3 supra),
which has been deemed inapplicable in North Dakota. Compare Iron Bear, aupra, woth
Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973)."
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their members to comply with state highway laws and vehicle regis-
tration laws; thus Indian drivers contribute to the state's Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund. 8 Justice Vogel argued that "[t]his is indicative
of an intention on the part of the Tribe to acquiesce in certain limited
state jurisdiction on the reservation. ' 49
The decision in Nelson v. Dubois follows a tendency evident in
modern cases to place greater emphasis on federal preemption rather
than on the concept of inherent Indian sovereignty. 0
The unfortunate result of decisions such as Nelson v. Dubois is to
deny many plaintiffs a forum for their actions against reservation
Indian defendants. 51 No tribe in North Dakota has as yet elected to
accept state jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1968; 52 thus the
state's courts are closed to actions against Indian defendants. A plain-
tiff's sole remedy, then, would be to proceed in tribal court.5 s How-
ever, as a general rule, North Dakota tribal codes limit tribal court
jurisdiction to actions involving less than $300 when a non-Indian is
involved.5 4 Thus non-Indian plaintiffs are in many cases denied re-
dress even in a tribal court. In addition, federal courts are not gen-
erally available for Indian litigation involving personal rights, 55 al-
48. Poltra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 29 n.10 (8th Cir. 1974). For an explanation of
North Dakota's Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, see note 2 supra.
49. 232 N.W.2d 54, 60 (N.D. 1975). It could be argued that a tribe cannot Impliedly
consent to state Jurisdiction. Initially it has been recognized that a tribe may cede only a
portion of its jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction once ceded can be withdrawn. Kennerly v.
Dist. Ct. of the Ninth Judicial Dist. of Montana. 400 U.S. 423, 429-30 & n.6 (1971). Fur-
ther, the procedure in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970) provides only
for affirmative cession by the tribe through an election. This would seem to preclude any
implied waiver from being effective to confer any jurisdiction on a state.
50. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Bad
Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d. 893 (1974).
In discussing the shift in emphasis, the United States Supreme Court in McClanahanstated: The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a back-
drop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.
It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once Inde-
pendent and sovereign nations ...
Mcdlanahan, supra, at 172.
In the Bad Horse decision, the Montana Supreme Court branded the concept of In-
dian sovereignty a "myth". Bad Horse, siinra at -, 517 P.2d at 897.
Former President Nixon in a 1970 address to Congress urged that body to repeal
its policy of termination of federal jurisdiction over reservation Indians which had been
adopted in 1953 (see note 12 aupra). PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON, THE AMERcAN INDIANS,
H.R. Doec. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). Congress has not re-asserted federal au-
thority over Indians to the extent that such authority was exercised prior to 1953.
51. Indian plaintiffs, in actions against Indian defendants, are subject to the same dis-
abilities that deny non-Indian plaintiffs a remedy in state courts. See Gourneau v. Smith,
207 N.W.2d 256 (N.D. 1973). On the other hand, it has long been recognized that state
courts are open to Indians as plaintiffs against non-Indians. See Felix v. Patrick, 145
U.S. 317 (1892) ; Bonnet v. Seekins, 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317 (1952) ; Vermillion v. Spot-
ted Elk, 85 N.W.2d 432 (N.D. 1957). See also F. COHEN, FEDERAL HANDBOOK OF INDIAN
LAw 379 (1942).
52. 1 NATIONAL AMERIcAN INDIAN COURT JuIoEs ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE AND THE AmEnIcAN
IHNDIA, THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAw 280 UPON THE ADMINISTaATION OF JUSTICE ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS 93 (1973).
53. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) ; Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482, 161 N.W.2d
704 (1968).
54. See, e.g., The Devils Lake Sioux Tribal Code of the Fort Totten Indian Reservation,
ch. I, § 1.2(c) ; The Code of Justice of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe § 1.2(c).
55. See Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Littel v. Nakal, 344
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though the scope of federal jurisdiction in this area is presently un-
clear in the Eighth Circuit.
5 6
There are several possible ways in which this situation might
be remedied. The tribes could, for example, take the initiative by al-
tering their jurisdictional limitations regarding non-Indian plain-
tiffs. 57 Failing tribal action, a solution might be found through reli-
ance on Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.18 In Schantz v. White
Lightning,"9 the Eighth Circuit stated that "tribal exclusion of non-
Indians [from tribal court] may well be said to violate the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968."60 This argument, however, has not been advanced by other
courts, nor has a non-Indian plaintiff thus far successfully alleged
federal court jurisdiction on the basis of this provision.6 '
Perhaps the most practical solution lies in congressional action
accepting the challenge issued by Nelson v. Dubois and other deci-
sions which reluctantly deny a forum to non-Indian plaintiffs. Con-
gressional grants of jurisdiction to the states have, in the past, tended
to weaken tribal governments.62 The desirable goal in solving the
problem presented in Nelson v. Dubois would be to provide a forum
for non-Indian plaintiffs and to protect tribal self-government within
the same piece of legislation. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 should be
amended to require that tribal courts be available to non-Indian
plaintiffs for all suits against Indian defendants. The additional re-
sponsibility might work to re-strengthen tribal governments and to
increase their efficiency. If the tribe does not choose to accept this
responsibility, it could still consent to state jurisdiction over such ac-
tions. Whenever disputes arise between Indians and non-Indians, each
party must be provided with a means to obtain an adequate remedy.
KAREN K. KLEIN
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
56. See Poltra v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974); Schantz v. White Lightning,
502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
57. Assertion of general Jurisdiction by tribal courts over all claims arising on the reser-
vation may not be desirable. If the Williams v. Lee interference test (see text accompany-
ing note 31 supra) is reciprocal, the question might be raised whether general tribal court
jurisdiction would unduly infringe upon state interests where both parties are non-Indians.
It has been suggested that tribal courts might assume specific subject matter jurisdiction
over claims which are closely connected with the reservation, through procedures similar
to those utilized in state long arm statutes. Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reser-
vation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 206, 223.
58. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970).
59. 368 F. Supp. 1070 (D.N.D. 1973), affd, 502 F.2d 67 (1974).
60. Id. at 70. The Indian Civil Rights Act referred to by the court is Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.
61. Id. at 70.
62. See PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON, THE AMERICAN INDIANS, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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